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Abstract Until recently, loss aversion has been inferred ex-
clusively from choice asymmetries in the loss and gain do-
mains. This study examines the impact of the prospect of
losses on exploratory search in a situation in which explora-
tion is costly. Taking advantage of the largest available data set
of decisions from experience, analyses showed that most peo-
ple explore payoff distributions more under the threat of a loss
than under the promise of a gain. This behavioral regularity
thus occurs in both costly search and cost-free search (see
Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, Cognition, 124, 334–342,
2012). Furthermore, a model comparison identified the simple
win-stay-lose-shift heuristic as a likely candidate mechanism
behind the loss–gain exploration asymmetry observed. In con-
trast, models assuming loss aversion failed to reproduce the
asymmetry. Moreover, the asymmetry was not simply a pre-
cursor of loss aversion but a phenomenon separate from it.
These findings are consistent with the recently proposed no-
tion of intensified vigilance in the face of potential losses.
Keywords Search . Decisions from experience .
Exploration . Loss attention . Loss aversion
BLosses loom larger than gains^ (p. 279) proposed Kahneman
and Tversky, in their influential 1979 article. Since then, loss
aversion—the idea that people are more concerned with losses
than with gains—has been used to explain a wide range of
classic behavioral regularities, such as framing effects
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the disposition effect (Weber
& Camerer, 1998), the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980), and
the sunk-cost effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). For decades,
loss aversion was inferred from choice, with no account being
taken of other dimensions fromwhich the aversion to losses or
its potential precursors could be gauged. It is only recently that
researchers have begun to study loss aversion by reference to
other accessible dimensions, including neural activation
(Rick, 2011; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007), physiolog-
ical arousal (Hochman & Yechiam, 2011; Yechiam, Retzer,
Telpaz, & Hochman, 2015), attention (Yechiam &
Hochman, 2013a, 2013b, 2014), and exploratory search
(Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012). The last of these is
the focus of this article.
Exploratory search in decisions from experience
To what extent can traces or precursors of loss aversion be found
in behavior beyond choice? To answer this question, Lejarraga
et al. (2012) took advantage of a fast-growing body of research
concerning the description–experience gap. In recent years,
many investigations have sought to understand the extent to
which choices between monetary gambles (payoff distributions)
differ systematically when decision makers draw on firsthand
experience of the probabilistic structure of those gambles
(Bdecisions from experience^) as opposed to when they are
informed about the structure of those gambles in symbolic form
(Bdecisions from description^; for a review, see Hertwig &
Erev, 2009; see also Hertwig, 2016). Many of these investiga-
tions have employed a simple tool to study decisions from
experience: a Bcomputerized money machine.^ Participants
see two buttons on a computer screen, each representing an
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unknown payoff distribution. Clicking a button results in a ran-
domdraw from the specified distribution.Most studies have used
two variants of this experimental tool. In the sampling paradigm
(e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Weber, Shafir, &
Blais, 2004), participants first sample as many outcomes as they
like and only then decide from which distribution to make a
single draw for real. In the partial-feedback paradigm (e.g.,
Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Barron, 2005), in contrast, each
draw contributes to participants’ earnings, and they receive draw-
by-draw feedback on their obtained payoffs.
Both experienced-based experimental paradigms offer an ad-
vantage relative to the study of decisions from description. They
lay open what is otherwise more difficult to discern: people’s
search for information.1 Search behavior in the sampling para-
digm is not incentivized directly, but only indirectly via the final
choice a person makes. Let us explain this point by considering
a key difference between the sampling and the partial-feedback
paradigms, namely, the degree to which they entail an explora-
tion–exploitation tradeoff (Sutton & Barto, 1998). In both para-
digms, every choice is associated with the goals of obtaining a
desired outcome (exploitation) or gathering new information
about other, perhaps better, outcomes (exploration). In the
partial-feedback paradigm, each draw from a payoff distribution
contributes to the participant’s earnings (or losses). As a conse-
quence, a balance needs to be struck between the simultaneous
demands of exploration and exploitation. How people, animals,
and even microorganisms balance these simultaneous de-
mands—and how they should do it—has been a central issue
in reinforcement-learning research (Cohen, McClure, & Yu,
2007; Lee, Zhang, Munro, & Steyvers, 2011; Sutton & Barto,
1998). Various factors have been found to affect this balance.
For example, people explore more when the expectation of a
change in the payoff structure increases (Cohen et al., 2007) and
when the horizon of the task is known to be long (Carstensen,
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Thus far, however, no general
optimal solution to this tradeoff has been proposed (but see
Gittins, 1979, for optimal tradeoffs in specific cases).
The sampling paradigm separates exploration and exploi-
tation, eliminating the tradeoff between them. The only costs
incurred by search are opportunity costs, time, and effort, as in
many other information-processing tasks. Although nothing is
at stake for the individual during sampling, exploring one
payoff distribution more than another may reflect attraction
or vigilance toward specific properties of the options. More
extensive exploration of a distribution in which losses loom
would permit a more accurate evaluation of the quantitative
risk of a loss. Against this background, Lejarraga et al. (2012)
investigated to what extent the risk of suffering a loss triggers
more search than the chance of reaping a gain. Screening
published data sets, Lejarraga et al. indeed found evidence
for more exploration of distributions that involved the risk of
losses, with a relative increase in search of, on average, 25 %
(aggregate level) and 29 % (individual level) in the loss rela-
tive to the gain domain. Taken together, these results indicate
that the choice domain—loss versus gain—has a discernible
impact on exploratory search in decisions from experience.
One objection to this loss–gain exploration asymmetry is
that, as pointed out earlier, search itself was not directly incen-
tivized, but only subsequent choice. Therefore, it is unclear to
what extent the asymmetry will generalize to situations in
which search exacts immediate costs. To address this issue, this
study investigates the extent to which the loss–gain search
asymmetry generalizes to costly search in the partial-feedback
paradigm. One proxy of costly exploratory search in this para-
digm is the rate of alternation between options: the proportion
of times an individual moves from choosing one option to
choosing the other option during repeated choices.
Hummingbirds, like other animals, are interpreted to be
exploiting a patch of flowers when they remain in it—and to
be exploring when theymove to a different one (e.g., Kramer &
Weary, 1991). Similarly, participants can be seen as exploiting
an option when they repeat a choice—and as exploring when
they switch to a different option.2 The rate of alternation is a
standard proxy for exploration and has been shown to decay
over time in repeated-choice tasks as people move from initial
exploration to subsequent exploitation (e.g., Cohen et al., 2007;
Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011, 2012; Hills & Hertwig, 2010, 2012;
Yechiam, Busemeyer, Stout, & Bechara, 2005). To the extent
that the loss–gain exploration asymmetry observed in the sam-
pling paradigm generalizes to costly exploration, one would
expect a higher alternation rate (assuming it to be an approxi-
mate measure of exploration) in the loss domain than in the gain
domain. Is there any evidence for such an asymmetry?
Yechiam, Zahavi, and Arditi (2015) examined this question
in a particular type of decision problem, namely, one in which
two options offered the same expected value (EV), and the
gambles were symmetric, with a 50 % chance of winning (or
losing) an amount of money and 50 % of not winning (or
losing) anything. They found that, on average, there were
higher alternation rates in the loss than in the gain domain.
Building on this initial result, we pursued three questions:
1 Of course, there are several sophisticated methods to track information
search in description-based paradigms (see Schulte-Mecklenbeck,
Kühberger, & Ranyard, 2011), such as eye-tracking devices (Glöckner,
Fiedler, Hochman, Ayal, & Hilbig, 2012). These methods track observ-
able proxies of the decision process, and on that basis make inferences
about other aspects that are not directly observable.
2 In a recent review of the literature on the exploration–exploitation
tradeoff (Mehlhorn et al., 2015), a set of experts endorsed the following
view: BBehavior is interpreted as exploration if it alternates between
patches or options, is unfocused, and is variable over time. Behavior is
interpreted as exploitation if it remains within a patch or option, is fo-
cused, and is stable over time^ (p. 193). There is one important difference
between our context and the animal foraging literature, however. In the
partial-feedback paradigm, a payoff distribution—unlike a food patch—
commonly does not deplete (because payoffs are drawn with
replacement).
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First, by examining the effect of choice domain on exploratory
search at the individual level and in a broad variety of decision
problems, we investigated whether and to what extent the
asymmetry observed in exploratory search is a robust behav-
ioral regularity. Second, we examined whether differences in
exploration at the individual level translate into differences in
risk taking in terms of loss aversion. Third, we used cognitive
modeling to reveal the mechanisms underlying any differ-
ences found in exploratory search as a function of domain.
Method
Our analysis took advantage of the largest available data set in
research employing the partial-feedback paradigm. Specifically,
we used the data set collected in the Technion Prediction
Tournament (TPT; Erev et al., 2010). The TPT is a prediction
competition in which different models were fitted to people’s
decisions from experience across 60 problems. The models
were then used to predict people’s choices in 60 new problems.
The competition involved two decisions-from-experience par-
adigms: the sampling paradigm (analyzed in Lejarraga et al.,
2012) and the partial-feedback paradigm that we consider here.
Each of the 120 problems represents a choice between a safe
option offering a medium (M) payoff with certainty and a risky
option offering a high (H) payoff with some probability (pH),
and a low (L) payoff with the complementary probability. In
each problem, participants made 100 repeated choices between
the risky and the safe option. After each choice, participants
received feedback on the payoff they obtained. M, H, pH, and
L were generated randomly, and a selection algorithm assured
that the 120 problems differed in domain (gains, losses, and
mixed payoffs) and probability (high, medium, and low).
Each of 200 participants made decisions in a subset of 12 prob-
lems: four in the gain domain, four in the loss domain, and four
in the mixed domain. The subset of problems was predefined,
but participants were assigned to a subset at random. Two par-
ticipants were excluded because of errors in the payoffs. The
final sample consisted of 198 participants.
Results
Is there, on average, a loss–gain search asymmetry
in the rate of exploration?
We calculated the mean alternation rate averaged across all par-
ticipants and all problems. Figure 1 shows the rate across the
choice sequences (i.e., for each of the 100 choices made within
each problem; upper panel), separately for the gain and loss do-
mains, and thedifferencebetween the respectivedomain-specific
rates (middle panel). The results show the typical transition from
exploration to exploitation,with a high rate of alternation in early
trials, increasingly replaced by exploitation and a lower rate of
alternation. Figure 1 (middle panel) also shows a consistent loss–
gain exploration asymmetry. Specifically, participants explored
more in loss than in gain payoff distributions. This asymmetry is
most pronounced in the earlier choices. It then decreases with
number of choices, and even reverses at trial 62. Although the
difference is small in each individual trial (seeCohen’sdvalues in
the lower panel ofFig. 1), individuals’ rate of alternation is higher
in the loss domain than in thegaindomain in a total of 86%of the
trials, 95%CI [80%, 93%].3
Is there a loss–gain exploration asymmetry in individuals’
rate of exploration?
Figure 1 plots aggregate data. Is the loss–gain search asym-
metry also present at the individual level? To answer this
question, we calculated the alternation rate for each participant
(aggregated across all choices in all problems), separately for
the gain and loss domain. Figure 2 plots individuals’ mean
alternation rate. A point above the diagonal represents an in-
dividual who alternates (explores) more in the loss than in the
gain domain. In contrast, a point below the diagonal represents
an individual who alternates (explores) more in the gain than
in the loss domain. Most participants (63 %) alternated more
in the loss domain; 35 % alternated more in the gain domain.
That is, almost twice as many people explored more in the loss
domain than in the gain domain, 27% [17%, 37%]. Only 2%
showed symmetrical rates (i.e., are located on the diagonal).
The loss–gain exploration asymmetry: An artifact
of the magnitude of EV?
Options in the loss domain by definition have lower (negative)
EVs than do those in the gain domain. It is therefore possible
that the loss–gain asymmetry in exploratory search could be a
function of the options’ EVs rather than of the domain.
Specifically, people may exploit more—and explore less—the
higher an option’s EV. To examine this possibility, we calculat-
ed the mean EVof each decision problem by averaging its safe
option and the EV of its risky option. We then calculated the
alternation rate in each problem for each participant. Using the
80 problems in the gain and loss domains of the TPT, we used
mixedmodels to examine the relative impact of mean EVand of
domain on alternation rate. First, we fitted a baseline model of
alternation rate with random intercepts for each participant. We
then fitted a second model, adding mean EV to the baseline
model (see Fig. 3, left panel), and a third model, adding the
3 The 95 % confidence interval does not include 50 %, meaning that we
are 95 % confident that the hypothesized asymmetry will generalize to
other experiments. In the rest of this Results section, we use the Bnew
statistics^ to analyze results (Cumming, 2012). We report means and
95 % confidence intervals and, when appropriate, we use differences in
means as measures of effect size.
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domain of choice to the baseline model (see Fig. 3, right panel).
We assessed the significance of the predictors, as well as their
relative explanatory power, by using likelihood ratio tests to
compare nested models. The relationship between alternation
rate and domain was significant, χ2(1) = 11.07, p < .001, as was
the relationship between alternation rate and mean EV, χ2(1) =
8.10, p = .004. However, domain of choice had higher explan-
atory power than did mean EV: A model with both mean EV
and domain was not better than a model with only domain,
χ2(1) = 0.02, p = .89, but was almost significantly better than
a model with only mean EV, χ2(1) = 2.99, p = .08.
Does the loss–gain exploration asymmetry result in more
loss aversion in choice?
According to Yechiam and Hochman (2013a), the possibility
of a loss intensifies the attention that a decision maker devotes
to the potential outcomes of a choice, without necessarily
triggering loss aversion. Loss attention raises the question of
to what extent individuals who explore the loss domain more
intensively also show increased aversion to losses when
choosing. Because the alternation rate is not orthogonal to
participants’ choice in the partial-feedback paradigm (the ex-
ploration–exploitation dilemma), we used different problems
Fig. 2 Individuals’ mean alternation rate (averaged across all problems
an individual responded to and across all 100 choice trials per problem),
separately for the gain and loss domain for the partial-feedback paradigm
of the Technion Prediction Tournament data set (Erev et al., 2010)
Fig. 1 Alternation rate between options (upper panel), separately for the
gain and loss domains, across all 100 choice trials for the partial-feedback
paradigm of the Technion Prediction Tournament data set (Erev et al.,
2010). Difference between the alternation rates in the loss and gain do-
mains (middle panel). Effect size measure, Cohen’s d, of the difference
between alternation rates (lower panel)
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to measure exploration and to examine its relationship to loss
aversion. Specifically, we first used problems in the gain and
loss domains to classify participants as predominantly Bloss
explorers^ versus predominately Bgain explorers.^ We then
used problems in the mixed domain to analyze the degree of
loss aversion, thus also taking advantage of the fact that it is in
precisely the mixed domain that loss aversion has mostly been
examined (Ert & Erev, 2008, 2013).
We classified individuals above the diagonal in Fig. 2 as loss
explorers, and individuals below the diagonal as gain explorers
(the few individuals with symmetric exploration behavior were
omitted from the analysis).We then used all 40mixed problems
to examine whether loss explorers were also more loss averse
than gain explorers. There were two classes of decision prob-
lems in the mixed domain. As Fig. 4 shows, all mixed problems
included gains and losses, but one class offered a safe gain
option (henceforth mixed-gain problems), whereas another of-
fered a safe loss option (henceforth mixed-loss problems).
We calculated the proportion of choices of the risky option
for loss and gain explorers, separately for mixed-gain and
mixed-loss problems. The mixed-gain problems offer people
who are averse to losses the choice of a seemingly safe gain.4
As Fig. 5 shows, the 95 % confidence intervals of the propor-
tions of risky choices overlapped notably on both mixed-gain
and mixed-loss problems, meaning that there was no differ-
ence in loss and gain explorers’ choices. More precisely, in
mixed-gain problems, the proportions of risky choices from
gain and loss explorers were 44 % [37 %, 50 %] and 49 %
[43 %, 53 %], respectively, and their difference was –4 % [–
12 %, 4 %]. Similarly, in mixed-loss problems the proportions
of risky choices from gain and loss explorers were 28 %
[22 %, 35 %] and 27 % [22 %, 32 %], respectively, and their
difference was 1 % [–6 %, 9 %].
These results suggest that individuals who allocate more
effort to exploring the loss domain than the gain domain do
not avoid losses in choice. That is, the loss–gain exploration
asymmetry does not predict or translate into loss aversion in
choice. This finding is consistent with our previous result show-
ing that increased search in the loss domain (relative to the gain
domain) in the sampling paradigm does not produce a larger
description–experience gap in choices (Lejarraga et al., 2012).
The exploration asymmetry thus appears to be a behavioral
regularity that cannot simply be reduced to loss aversion or to
being a close analog of loss aversion. To better understand its
essence, we next applied cognitive modeling to shed light on
the processes underlying exploration asymmetry.
Models of choices
To further examine the mechanisms behind the observed
asymmetry in exploratory search, we first identified plausible
Fig. 4 Two illustrative decision problems from themixed domain used in
the partial-feedback paradigm of the Technion Prediction Tournament
data set (Erev et al., 2010): a mixed-gain problem, in which the safe
option is a gain outcome (left), and a mixed-loss problem, in which the
safe option is a loss outcome (right)
4 To derive stronger, directional, predictions, we also compared the pre-
dictions of an EV model with those of the same model including a loss-
aversion parameter set at 2.25 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Loss aver-
sion increases the attractiveness of the safe option in both mixed-gain and
mixed-loss problems.Moreover, this preference for the safe option should
be higher in mixed-gain than in mixed-loss problems. Therefore, if loss
explorers are more averse to losses, they should reveal a lower preference
for the risky option than gain explorers in both types of problems, and this
difference should be larger in the mixed-gain problems. As Figure 5
shows, there was no such difference.
Fig. 3 Relationship between alternation rate andmagnitude of problems’
EVs in the partial-feedback paradigm of the Technion Prediction
Tournament data set (Erev et al., 2010). The graph shows only
alternation rates within 0 and .5. The left panel shows a linear model
with mean EVs as the only predictor. The right panel shows a model
with domain of choice as the only predictor
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models of behavior in the partial-feedback paradigm, includ-
ing models that do and do not assume loss aversion. Second,
we fitted eachmodel to the choice behavior of each individual,
calibrating the parameters so as to minimize the discrepancy
between the prediction of the model and the actual choice
observed in each trial. Third, we examined how the model
predictions tracked the observed asymmetry in exploration;
that is, we evaluated the extent to which, aggregated across
individuals, the model predictions were able to reproduce the
upper panel in Fig. 1.
We entered three types of models into the analysis: (i) four
specifications of reinforcement-learning models5; (ii) an
instance-based learning model, which has previously been
shown to capture aggregate behavior in this data set accurately
(Lejarraga, Dutt, & Gonzalez, 2012),6 and (iii) a win-stay-
lose-shift model, which explained the behavior of the majority
of participants in a similar task (i.e., the Iowa gambling task;
Worthy, Hawthorne, & Otto, 2013).We asked three questions:
(1) Is the assumption of loss aversion necessary to describe the
data well? To answer this question, we examined whether
models assuming loss aversion fitted the data better than did
models not assuming loss aversion. (2) Does loss aversion
reproduce the observed loss–gain asymmetry in exploration?
Here, we identified those participants who were best fitted by
parameters indicating loss aversion. We then aggregated mod-
el predictions across participants and examined whether the
predictions reproduced the loss–gain exploration asymmetry.
Finally, (3) which process reproduces the observed asymme-
try in exploration?
Reinforcement-learning models Reinforcement-learning
models have three elements: (a) a utility function that is used
to evaluate the outcomes encountered; (b) a learning rule that
is used to update the value or expectancy of each option; and
(c) a choice rule that is used to select between the options. We
analyzed the performance of four reinforcement models that
differed in their utility function.
RL-baseline model This model assumes that the utility of an
outcome is equal to its monetary amount and, importantly, it
makes no distinction between gains and losses. The utility u of
an option for trial t is
u tð Þ ¼ x tð Þ; ð1Þ
where x(t) denotes the amount of money won or lost on trial t.
The model assumes that the decision maker develops an
expectancy for each option (i.e., an expectation of the utility
of the option). The expectancy Ej(t) for option j in trial t is
E j tð Þ ¼ E j t−1ð Þ þ ϕ⋅δ j tð Þ⋅ u tð Þ−E j t−1ð Þ
 
; ð2Þ
where δj(t) = 1 if the outcome of option j was observed in trial
t, and δj(t) = 0, otherwise. The learning rate ϕ (0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1) indi-
cates the degree to which the latest option influences the ex-
pectancy for the option. Higher ϕ values indicate more recen-
cy. In the first trial, Ej(t − 1) is assumed to be 0. Finally, the
probability of choosing option j follows Luce’s rule (1959)
and is defined as follows:
P j; t þ 1ð Þ ¼ e









where θ(t) is the trial-dependent sensitivity to the differ-
ences in expectancies and c (− 5 ≤ c ≤ 5) is a consistency
parameter. Positive values of c indicate that the option
with the higher expectancy will be chosen as the num-
ber of trials increases. Negative values of c indicate
more random choices as the number of trials increases.
This model has been used to capture learning pro-
cesses in various domains, particularly in repeated
5 The four reinforcement-learning models we implemented represent a
subset of the wide variety of reinforcement-learning models that have
been proposed. We assumed relatively simple processes in our analysis
to examine the influence of loss aversion as orthogonally as possible from
other processes. For example, Worthy, Pang, and Byrne (2013) proposed
an eight-parameter model incorporating a reinforcement-learning mode
and a perseveration mode. Such a model could potentially capture behav-
ior well, but its predictions are derived from a weighted average of a
standard reinforcement process and a win-stay-lose-shift process, making
the interpretation of results more intricate than when those processes are
compared separately, as is done here.
6 To put this model on the same footing as the other models, we fitted it at
the individual level. This resulted in parameters that were unstable across
estimation runs. We therefore do not detail the model and its results—the
code is available in the supplementary material.
Fig. 5 Proportion of choices of the risky payoff distribution, separately
for gain and loss explorers (see text) and for mixed-gain and mixed-loss
problems (see Fig. 4) in the partial-feedback paradigm of the Technion
Prediction Tournament data set (Erev et al., 2010). Error bars show 95 %
confidence intervals. Gain explorers are shown by a dashed green line and
loss explorers by a solid red line. (Color figure online)
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choice (Busemeyer & Myung, 1992; Worthy & Maddox,
2014; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005).
RL-lambda model This model is identical to the RL-baseline
model, except that it assumes loss aversion. Therefore, the
utility function is not [1] but
u tð Þ ¼ x tð Þ if x tð Þ ≥ 0−λ x tð Þj j if x tð Þ < 0

: ð5Þ
The parameter λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 5) indicates the degree of loss
aversion. Values above 1 indicate greater sensitivity to losses
than to gains, and values below 1 indicate the opposite.
RL-PVL model This model is identical to the RL-baseline
model, except that it assumes a prospect theory value function
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; prospect valence learning was
proposed by Ahn, Busemeyer, Wagenmakers, & Stout, 2008).
Instead of [1], outcomes are valued according to
u tð Þ ¼ x tð Þ
α if x tð Þ ≥ 0
−λ x tð Þj jα if x tð Þ < 0

: ð6Þ
Parameter λ operates in the same manner as in [5]. The
shape of the utility function is governed by α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), with
lower values indicating higher curvature and with α = 1 indi-
cating linear utilities.
RL-EVLmodel This model was proposed by Busemeyer and
Stout (2002) and named the expectancy valence learningmod-
el. It is identical to the RL-baseline model, except that it as-
sumes an alternative specification of loss aversion. Here, the
utility of an outcome is
u tð Þ ¼ 2−wð Þ⋅x tð Þ if x tð Þ ≥ 0− w x tð Þj j if x tð Þ < 0

: ð7Þ
The w (0 ≤w ≤ 2) parameter indicates the weight of losses
relative to gains. When w = 1, losses and gains are weighed
equally; w > 1 indicates greater weight to losses than to gains;
and w < 1 indicates the opposite.
Win-stay-lose-shift Alternatively, people may apply a
simple heuristic to choose between options in the
partial-feedback paradigm (Novak & Sigmund, 1993).
According to the win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) model,
people tend to switch to a different option (shift) after
experiencing a loss and to replicate a choice (stay) after
experiencing a gain. Consistent with the common imple-
mentation of this heuristic (Worthy & Maddox, 2014),
losses and gains are defined relative to the immediately
previous outcome: If the current outcome is higher than
or equal to the previous outcome, the trial is considered
a win; otherwise, it is considered a loss.
The model makes probabilistic predictions, with two
parameters indicating the probability of staying given a
win, p(stay|win), and the probability of shifting given a
loss, p(shift|loss). Consequently, the corresponding prob-
ability of shifting after a win is 1 − p(stay|win) and that
of staying after a loss is 1 − p(shift|loss). Because these
probabilities are constant across trials, Worthy and
Maddox (2014) proposed a process by which they are
permitted to change across trials, thus capturing the ob-
servation that the reaction to losses and gains changes
across trials.
If x(t) ≥ x(t − 1), the trial is considered a Bwin,^ and the







þ θp stayjwinð Þ⋅ 1−p stayjwinð Þt
 
ð8Þ
and p shift lossjð Þtþ1 ¼ 1−θp shift lossjð Þ
 
⋅ p shift lossjð Þt; ð9Þ
where θp(stay|win) determines the change in p(stay|win) and
θp(shift|loss) determines the change in p(shift|loss).
If x(t) < x(t − 1), the trial is considered a Bloss,^ and the
probabilities for the subsequent trial are
p shift lossjð Þtþ1 ¼ p shift lossjð Þt þ θp shift lossjð Þ⋅ 1−p shift lossjð Þt
  ð10Þ
and p stay winjð Þtþ1 ¼ 1−θp stay winjð Þ
 
⋅ p stay winjð Þt: ð11Þ
Estimation of the modelsWe estimated each model so as
to minimize the difference between its predictions and
actual behavior. Specifically, we estimated the parame-
ters of each model for each participant, based on the fit
between the model prediction for t + 1 to the observed
choice, using the log likelihood method (LL). For each
model, we calculated the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC; Schwarz, 1978):
BIC ¼ −2 LLmodelð Þ þ k⋅ln Nð Þ; ð12Þ
where k is the number of free parameters estimated in
the model and N is the number of trials used to calcu-
late the LL of the model (12 problems × 100 trials,
N = 1, 200).
We used a grid search with .1 increments along the param-
eter space. When the resulting grid was too large (as in RL-
lambda, RL-EVL, and RL-PVL), we used a combination of
grid search (with .25 increments) and the Broyden–Fletcher–
Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) optimization algorithm. All models




Is the assumption of loss aversion necessary to describe
the data well?
Table 1 shows the accuracy of the models. Lower BIC values
indicate better fit. Different specifications of the utility function
(RL-lambda, RL-PVL, and RL-EVL) improved the fit of the
reinforcement-learning models over the RL-baseline model.
However, the resulting parameters did not indicate loss aversion,
but the contrary: λ and w parameters below 1 indicate higher
sensitivity to gains than to losses. These results support our
previous observation that more exploration in the loss domain
does not result in choices that reflect aversion to losses. They are
also consistent with the idea that losses increase arousal and on-
task attention (Yechiam & Hochman, 2013a).
Does loss aversion reproduce the observed loss–gain
asymmetry in exploration?
To address this question, we focused on participants
whose best-fitting parameters indicated loss aversion
(λ > 1 or w > 1). We obtained the models’ predictions
for each individual and recorded the alternations in each
trial. We then calculated the alternation rate across par-
ticipants for each trial in order to examine whether the
model predictions reproduced the loss–gain asymmetry
in exploration. As Fig. 6 shows, models with loss aver-
sion—the RL-lambda, the RL-PVL, and RL-EVL mod-
el—did not reproduce the observed asymmetry in explo-
ration (displayed in lighter colors). In the RL-lambda
and RL-PVL models, the alternation rates in the gain
and loss domains are indistinguishable, whereas the
RL-EVL model shows more exploration in the gain than
in the loss domain. These findings suggest that the ob-
served asymmetry in exploration does not result from
assuming different utilities for losses and gains, but
from a different process.
Which process reproduces the observed asymmetry
in exploration?
We found strong evidence that participants employ a win-stay-
lose-shift heuristic, and, importantly, that this applies when
losses and gains are defined relatively and not in absolute
terms. Because the model assumes that participants repeat
their choice after a win but switch after a loss, it implies that
reactions to gains versus losses differ, with losses generating
higher alternation rates. Indeed, the best-fitting parameters in
Table 1 indicate a higher tendency to switch after a loss (.63)
than after a gain (.42 = 1 – .58). However, the definition of a
gain and a loss in this model does not depend on the positive
(gain) or negative (loss) sign of the outcome, but on the rela-
tive magnitude of current and previous outcomes. Even with
this conceptualization of gains and losses, the model captures
three characteristics of the observed patterns of exploration
(see Fig. 1, upper panel): (1) a higher exploration rate among
losses than among gains in approximately the first 50 trials
(Fig. 6), (2) a gradual transition from exploration to exploita-
tion, and (3) and a converging rate of exploration across do-
mains that approaches 0.1.
Why does the asymmetry in exploration emerge?
The results of our modeling point to a possible process by
which people end up exploring options more under the threat
of losses than under the promise of gains. It thus suggests how
the observed asymmetry in exploration could emerge but not
why it emerges. Next, we discuss two possible explanations
for the asymmetry. Let us first highlight that in decisions from
experience—such as those studied here—people face uncer-
tainty (or ambiguity, a term more commonly used in the eco-
nomics literature). Specifically, they do not initially know ei-
ther the outcome space they face or the outcomes’ probabili-
ties. Exploration is the process by which they learn about the
outcome space and relative frequencies, thus reducing uncer-
tainty. It has often been observed that people facing uncertain-
Table 1 Mean BIC Scores and Model Parameters
BIC ϕ c λ α W
Chance 1,663 (0) – – – – – – – – – –
RL-baseline 1,401 (334) 0.54 (0.41) –0.92 (2.93) – – – – – –
RL-lambda 1,253 (318) 0.40 (0.40) 0.24 (2.10) 0.88 (1.69) – – – –
RL-PVL 1,195 (291) 0.41 (0.37) 1.43 (1.39) 0.98 (1.83) 0.50 (0.36) – –
RL-EVL 1,267 (329) 0.52 (0.40) 0.32 (2.25) – – – – 0.64 (0.8)
BIC p(stay|win) p(shift|loss) θp(shift|loss) θp(stay|win)
WSLS 723 (324) 0.58 (0.30) 0.63 (0.31) 0.21 (0.22) 0.25 (0.26)
Note. Values in parentheses are standard deviations. The RL-lambda, RL-PVL, and RL-EVLmodels include loss aversion parameters (λ andW). Values
larger than 1 on these parameters would indicate loss aversion
Psychon Bull Rev
ty tend to employ simple heuristics and rules that enable
choices and inferences, even when knowledge of likelihoods
is nonexistent or relatively rudimentary (Gigerenzer, Hertwig,
& Pachur, 2011; Savage, 1954). Under uncertainty, some sim-
ple processes may even be prescribed: BSuch rules as
minimaxing . . . are usually prescribed for situations of ‘com-
plete ignorance,’ in which a decision-maker lacks any infor-
mation whatever on relative likelihoods^ (Ellsberg, 1961, p.
657). Building on the premise of simple processes being en-
gaged to tame uncertainty, we suggest that the asymmetry in
exploration could be a by-product of the reliance on
boundedly rational processes of human decision making.
Specifically, we consider Simon’s (1956) notion of satisficing
and Wald’s (1945) minimax rule.
Aspiration levels as stopping rules Simon (1956) offered a
novel view on rationality, according to which organisms make
good enough (Bsatisficing^) rather than optimizing choices,
particularly under circumstances in which the conditions for
rationality postulated by the model of neoclassical economics
are not met (e.g., full knowledge of the probability
distributions for uncertain events; Simon, 1989, p. 377) and
the optimum is not computable. His concern was with how
decision makers can find satisfactory solutions in a realistic
world. Let us consider the principle of satisficing in the con-
text of Simon’s model of a simple toy organism whose sole
goal is to eat. It has limited storage capacity and needs to
maintain a minimum level of energy to survive. Once this
level of Baspiration^ is surpassed, the organism rests. To meet
its energetic needs, the organism explores the environment
(e.g., a plane with heaps of food or a maze with branching
paths) to locate food and then eats (exploits) it.
How could a gain–loss exploration asymmetry arise for this
simple organism? Let us first consider what counts as a loss
domain. One construal could be in terms of the organism’s
energetic state. From this perspective, the organism will enter
the loss domain whenever its energy level falls below a sub-
sistence threshold—its aspiration level. As long as the organ-
ism is in this state, it needs to explore. Once the energy level is
back above this threshold and the organism has thus entered
the gain domain, it will cease to explore. An alternative con-
strual could be not in terms of the organism’s state but in terms
of the ecology it faces. For instance, if the quality of food
patches is such that each single patch does not suffice to push
the organism above the subsistence threshold, or if good-
enough patches are extremely rare, the organism is in the loss
domain. Consequently, it will need to keep exploring once a
patch has been exploited (or once the rate of return has
dropped below the average rate of payoff for the entire area;
Charnov, 1976). In contrast, a resources-rich environment
(gain domain) will offer many patches that yield Benough.^
Finding a dense patch will thus render it unnecessary to
Fig. 6 Alternation rates by trial predicted by the best-fitting models for each individual. The darker lines indicate alternation rates predicted by the
models. The lighter lines indicate the observed alternation rates
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explore further. Still another construal defines the loss domain
not in terms of resources per se but in terms of competitive
dynamics. A loss domain could then be one in which patches
come with substantial predation risks. In this context, an or-
ganism may have to continue exploring until it finds a rela-
tively Bsafe^ patch. The gain domain would be one in which
the predation risk is small or nonexistent.
Admittedly, these are simplistic and hypothetical scenarios
and interpretations of what loss versus gain domain could
mean. Yet in each one, the toy organism proposed by Simon
would explore more in the loss than in the gain domain. To the
extent that the experimental decisions-from-experience para-
digms are (remote) proxies of these scenarios, the activation of
aspiration levels that function as stopping rules may produce
asymmetries in exploratory behavior. Interestingly, the win-
stay-lose-shift model in our analysis can be viewed as a kind
of satisficing model, in which the decision maker uses an
aspiration level that resets after every outcome and makes a
probabilistic choice.
The minimax rule Another simple process that could give
rise to the observed asymmetry in exploration is the minimax
rule, a choice rule devised by Wald (1945; see also Savage’s,
1954, maximin rule) to Bminimize the maximum risk^ when
facing uncertain options. According to minimax, the decision
maker ranks the options according to his or her worst-case
outcome and chooses the one with the least worst outcome.
Minimax can be seen asmaking a bet about the structure of the
environment and acts as if it Blives^ in a hostile environment
where the worst thing that could happenwill always happen—
and could potentially pose an existential threat.7 The rule im-
plies that the decision maker searches for the worst possible
outcome for each option. It is only after exploration has re-
vealed all bad things that could possibly happen that the deci-
sion maker can hope to choose in a way that maximizes the
minimum outcome. If the same decision maker encounters
positive outcomes, which no longer trigger the goal of
preventing the worst, one may expect explorative efforts to
be less exhaustive than in the actual loss domain.
The two possible explanations for why a loss–gain asym-
metry may occur are admittedly speculative. Yet they offer a
link from research on decisions from experience to Simon’s
(1956, 1978) concepts of satisficing and aspiration level as
well as to Wald’s (1945) and Savage’s (1954) work on strate-
gies for making decisions in the face of uncertainty. Both
explanations, combined with the specific win-stay-lose-shift
account proposed here, can inform future work on the dynam-
ic of exploration across the various decisions-from-experience
paradigms.
Conclusions
In most investigations of loss aversion, cumulative prospect
theory’s loss-aversion parameter has been gauged by fitting it
to individuals’ choices. Yet choice is not the only observable
manifestation of humans’ (assumed) preferences. External
search for information is another. Research on decisions from
experience (see Hertwig & Erev, 2009) has taken advantage of
this search behavior to advance the scientific understanding of
human choice. Analyzing exploratory search in the sampling
paradigm, Lejarraga et al. (2012) found a loss–gain explora-
tion asymmetry: When facing the risk of losses, most people
invested more effort in exploring potentially disadvantageous
(loss) than advantageous (gain) payoff distributions.
However, this asymmetry occurred in a situation in which
exploration did not have explicit monetary consequences;
the sampling paradigm incentivizes only choice, but not
search.
To find out whether the loss–gain exploration asymmetry
generalizes to costly search, we analyzed data collected within
another decision-from-experience paradigm: the partial-
feedback paradigm. Unlike the sampling paradigm, this para-
digm invokes an exploration–exploitation trade-off: The out-
come of each draw made increases or decreases the final pay-
off. Nevertheless, we found the same kind of loss–gain explo-
ration asymmetry as in the sampling paradigm (Lejarraga
et al., 2012). In other words, in both costly and cost-free
search, most individuals explored more when facing the threat
of losses than the promise of gains. This finding is consistent
with the notion of loss attention, that is, intensified vigilance
in the face of potential losses (Yechiam & Hochman, 2013a,
2013b, 2014). Interestingly, however, this robust loss–gain
exploration asymmetry is not a precursor of loss aversion in
choice. In our analysis, loss explorers ended up making the
same choices as gain explorers in the domain of mixed
gambles.
We then used cognitive modeling to investigate the mech-
anism behind the loss–gain exploration asymmetry.
Specifically, we fitted and analyzed the predictions of various
models that assumed different instantiations of utility, includ-
ing linear utilities, different forms of loss aversion, and no
utility function at all. Three patterns emerged from the model-
ing analysis. First, loss aversion was not manifest in the pa-
rameter values of models that were fitted to individuals’
choices in the partial-feedback paradigm (Table 1). Second,
models equipped with a parameter to capture loss aversion did
not fit the data better than a win-stay-lose-shift heuristic
7 Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests that such a pessimistic outlook
may be more likely to be triggered in a world ripe with uncertainty:
Under uncertainty, the brain is alerted to the fact that information is
missing, that choices based on the information available therefore carry
more unknown (and potentially dangerous) consequences, and that cog-
nitive and behavioral resources must be mobilized in order to seek out
additional information from the environment. (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs,
Tranel, & Camerer, 2005, p. 1683)
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(Table 1). In addition, the former models could not reproduce
the asymmetric pattern of exploration, whereas the WSLS
model captured both the asymmetry (Fig. 6) and the overall
level of exploration. Importantly, it also captured the reduction
in the asymmetry across trials: The model incorporates two
parameters (θs) that gradually change the initial tendencies to
stay after a win and to switch after a loss, prompting these
tendencies to converge to 1 and 0, respectively. Therefore, the
tendency to switch after a loss or after a gain reduces to 0
across trials, grinding away the differences in exploration in
gains and losses (as conceptualized in the model).
The assumed human aversion to losses—that is, the stron-
ger weighting of losses relative to gains—has nearly a law-
like status in psychology and beyond. According to Wakker
(2010), Bthe main empirical phenomenon concerning the dis-
tinction between gains and losses is loss aversion^ (p. 238).
Kahneman, whose work with Tversky on prospect theory
established loss aversion as a key concept (though it was
invoked earlier; e.g., Robertson, 1915, p. 135), recently em-
phasized its importance beyond the laboratory and beyond
student samples in an interview:
In my classes, I say: BI’m going to toss a coin, and if it’s
tails, you lose $10. How much would you have to gain
on winning in order for this gamble to be acceptable to
you?^ People want more than $20 before it is accept-
able. And now I’ve been doing the same thing with
executives or very rich people, asking about tossing a
coin and losing $10,000 if it’s tails. And they want
$20,000 before they’ll take the gamble. (Richards,
2013, para. 6)
For decades, the existence and the magnitude of loss aver-
sion has mostly been inferred from such overt choices based
on stated probabilities. It is only recently that researchers have
begun to look at lower-level processes and discovered that
loss aversion is not the only mechanism at play. The threat
of losses also triggers heightened autonomic responses such as
physiological arousal (Hochman & Yechiam, 2011; Yechiam,
Retzer, et al., 2015). Equally important, this recent research
has shown that there can even be a dissociation between in-
creased arousal and attention and behavioral loss aversion in
experienced-based decision tasks: An increased focus on the
task in response to the threat of losses may enhance the indi-
vidual’s sensitivity to the task’s reinforcement structure but
does not necessarily translate into behavioral loss aversion,
that is, to people giving more weight to losses than to gains
when making decisions.
Another behavioral dimension in which increased attention
to the payoff structure of a task can becomemanifest is search.
Like Yechiam and Hochman (2013a, 2013b, 2014), we found
more exploration in the loss than in the gain domain, as well as
a dissociation between this exploratory behavior and loss
aversion in experienced-based choice (see also Lejarraga
et al., 2012). Building on Yechiam and Hochman’s findings,
we first showed that this asymmetric exploration pattern is
prevalent both at the aggregate and at the individual level,
and that it also emerges when a large variety of problems is
used. Second, we found that the decisions made by individuals
who show this asymmetry do not differ qualitatively from
those of individuals who show the opposite asymmetry.
Third, and importantly, we identified a likely candidate mech-
anism behind the observed loss–gain asymmetry in explora-
tion: the win-stay-lose-shift heuristic. This mechanism does
not invoke loss aversion but postulates that losses lead to a
lower propensity to replicate a choice than gains do.
Taken together, our results indicate that the loss–gain
asymmetry in exploration is a robust behavioral regularity in
contexts where people have to learn from experience when
making choices (see also Ert & Erev, 2008, 2013; Walasek
& Stewart, 2015) and that it is an invariant property of both
cost-free and costly search. In addition, in both kinds of
search, there seems to be a dissociation between loss–gain
asymmetry in exploration and loss aversion in choice.
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